**Severe economic hardship, frequent blackouts, and rising protests have not fractured Cuba’s ruling structures or produced regime change in 2026.** Miguel Díaz-Canel’s government continues to exercise centralized control through the Communist Party, military-linked enterprises such as GAESA, and internal security forces, while responding to unrest with repression and limited concessions. U.S. policy under the current administration has emphasized sustained sanctions, fuel restrictions, and legal measures aimed at long-term attrition rather than immediate overthrow, with public statements projecting pressure extending into 2029. In response, Cuban authorities have enacted a package of 176 economic measures to expand private activity and attract investment without altering the one-party system or core leadership. Protests reached record levels in the first half of the year, yet emigration and the absence of coordinated elite defections or a unified domestic opposition have limited their political impact. Traders therefore assign an 87% probability to the regime remaining in power through the end of 2026, reflecting the durability of institutional controls amid ongoing hardship.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourLe régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Le régime cubain tombe en 2026 ?
Oui
13% chance
$1,630,233 Vol.
$1,630,233 Vol.
30 déc. 2026
Oui
13% chance
$1,630,233 Vol.
$1,630,233 Vol.
30 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**Severe economic hardship, frequent blackouts, and rising protests have not fractured Cuba’s ruling structures or produced regime change in 2026.** Miguel Díaz-Canel’s government continues to exercise centralized control through the Communist Party, military-linked enterprises such as GAESA, and internal security forces, while responding to unrest with repression and limited concessions.
U.S. policy under the current administration has emphasized sustained sanctions, fuel restrictions, and legal measures aimed at long-term attrition rather than immediate overthrow, with public statements projecting pressure extending into 2029. In response, Cuban authorities have enacted a package of 176 economic measures to expand private activity and attract investment without altering the one-party system or core leadership. Protests reached record levels in the first half of the year, yet emigration and the absence of coordinated elite defections or a unified domestic opposition have limited their political impact.
Traders therefore assign an 87% probability to the regime remaining in power through the end of 2026, reflecting the durability of institutional controls amid ongoing hardship.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ET
Volume
$1,630,233Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
**Severe economic hardship, frequent blackouts, and rising protests have not fractured Cuba’s ruling structures or produced regime change in 2026.** Miguel Díaz-Canel’s government continues to exercise centralized control through the Communist Party, military-linked enterprises such as GAESA, and internal security forces, while responding to unrest with repression and limited concessions.
U.S. policy under the current administration has emphasized sustained sanctions, fuel restrictions, and legal measures aimed at long-term attrition rather than immediate overthrow, with public statements projecting pressure extending into 2029. In response, Cuban authorities have enacted a package of 176 economic measures to expand private activity and attract investment without altering the one-party system or core leadership. Protests reached record levels in the first half of the year, yet emigration and the absence of coordinated elite defections or a unified domestic opposition have limited their political impact.
Traders therefore assign an 87% probability to the regime remaining in power through the end of 2026, reflecting the durability of institutional controls amid ongoing hardship.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) ceases to exercise de facto governing control over Cuba by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A “Yes” resolution requires a clear and widely reported break from the PCC’s historical control over the government of Cuba. This may include events such as the overthrow or dissolution of the PCC and its replacement by a new government or transitional authority, the constitutional removal of the PCC’s status as the sole ruling party followed by a transfer of governing power to a different political entity, or the holding of multi-party national elections that result in a government not controlled by the PCC. A “Yes” resolution does not require the formal dissolution of the PCC, provided the PCC no longer exercises de facto governing control over Cuba.
Leadership changes within the PCC, including replacement of the First Secretary, or governmental reforms that preserve the PCC’s de facto governing control over Cuba, will not suffice. Partial loss of territory, civil unrest, or challenges by rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the PCC no longer administers the majority of the Cuban population within Cuba.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$1,630,233Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Mar 10, 2026, 7:56 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Severe economic hardship, frequent blackouts, and rising protests have not fractured Cuba’s ruling structures or produced regime change in 2026.** Miguel Díaz-Canel’s government continues to exercise centralized control through the Communist Party, military-linked enterprises such as GAESA, and internal security forces, while responding to unrest with repression and limited concessions. U.S. policy under the current administration has emphasized sustained sanctions, fuel restrictions, and legal measures aimed at long-term attrition rather than immediate overthrow, with public statements projecting pressure extending into 2029. In response, Cuban authorities have enacted a package of 176 economic measures to expand private activity and attract investment without altering the one-party system or core leadership. Protests reached record levels in the first half of the year, yet emigration and the absence of coordinated elite defections or a unified domestic opposition have limited their political impact. Traders therefore assign an 87% probability to the regime remaining in power through the end of 2026, reflecting the durability of institutional controls amid ongoing hardship.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
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