Trader consensus heavily favors "No" at 93.5% implied probability for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of credible intelligence, official threats, or preparatory actions from Tehran. Recent Red Sea cable disruptions, like those affecting SEACOM and EIG lines in February-March, were linked to Yemen's Houthis—Tehran's proxies—rather than direct Iranian operations, with Yemen denying involvement and no evidence implicating Iran proper. Amid Israel-Iran shadow war tensions and U.S. naval patrols, escalation risks and international backlash deter overt sabotage, while diplomatic channels remain active; traders price in these geopolitical constraints absent new catalysts.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket · AtualizadoO Irã vai sabotar os cabos submarinos de internet até 30 de abril?
O Irã vai sabotar os cabos submarinos de internet até 30 de abril?
Sim
Sim
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado Aberto: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus heavily favors "No" at 93.5% implied probability for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of credible intelligence, official threats, or preparatory actions from Tehran. Recent Red Sea cable disruptions, like those affecting SEACOM and EIG lines in February-March, were linked to Yemen's Houthis—Tehran's proxies—rather than direct Iranian operations, with Yemen denying involvement and no evidence implicating Iran proper. Amid Israel-Iran shadow war tensions and U.S. naval patrols, escalation risks and international backlash deter overt sabotage, while diplomatic channels remain active; traders price in these geopolitical constraints absent new catalysts.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket · Atualizado
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