Trader consensus shows low implied probability for direct Iranian military action against a Gulf state like Saudi Arabia or the UAE, amid sustained détente from the 2023 China-brokered Iran-Saudi reconciliation and shared economic interests in oil stability. Proxy escalations persist, including Houthi drone strikes on Red Sea shipping tied to Gulf ports, but Tehran has avoided overt attacks following its April 2024 missile barrage on Israel, which drew restrained responses. Gulf leaders prioritize de-escalation via U.S.-mediated talks, with no verified intelligence on Iranian strike preparations. Key upcoming catalysts include Iran nuclear negotiations in Oman and potential Gaza ceasefire progress, which could ease broader tensions.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket · AtualizadoIran military action against a Gulf State on...?
Iran military action against a Gulf State on...?
April 1
52%
April 2
49%
April 3
50%
April 4
50%
April 5
50%
April 6
50%
April 7
50%
April 8
49%
April 9
50%
April 10
50%
$1 Vol.
April 1
52%
April 2
49%
April 3
50%
April 4
50%
April 5
50%
April 6
50%
April 7
50%
April 8
49%
April 9
50%
April 10
50%
Qualifying "Gulf States" are as follows: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Only military actions by Iranian forces explicitly claimed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, or confirmed to have originated from Iranian territory, will count toward the resolution of this market. Attacks by proxy forces (i.e. Hezbollah, Houthis, etc.) will not count toward the resolution of this market.
For the purposes of this market, a qualifying "military action" is defined as the use of aerial bombs, drones, or missiles (including cruise or ballistic missiles) launched by Iranian military forces that impact a gulf state's ground territory.
A strike on any area within the terrestrial territory of a listed gulf state counts.
Missiles or drones that are intercepted and surface-to-air missile strikes will not be sufficient for a "Yes" resolution, regardless of whether they land on a gulf state's territory or cause damage.
Actions such as artillery fire, small arms fire, FPV or ground-based ATGM strikes, ground incursions, naval shelling, cyberattacks, or other operations conducted by Iranian ground operatives will not qualify.
The primary solution resolution source will be official government/military statements (Iranian or foreign), multilateral bodies (UN, etc.), or a consensus of credible reporting from major international media and national broadcasters/newspapers.
If the date/time of a strike cannot be confirmed by a consensus of credible reporting by the end of the third calendar date after this market's end date, it will resolve to "No" regardless of whether a strike was later confirmed to have taken place.
Mercado Aberto: Mar 24, 2026, 1:05 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus shows low implied probability for direct Iranian military action against a Gulf state like Saudi Arabia or the UAE, amid sustained détente from the 2023 China-brokered Iran-Saudi reconciliation and shared economic interests in oil stability. Proxy escalations persist, including Houthi drone strikes on Red Sea shipping tied to Gulf ports, but Tehran has avoided overt attacks following its April 2024 missile barrage on Israel, which drew restrained responses. Gulf leaders prioritize de-escalation via U.S.-mediated talks, with no verified intelligence on Iranian strike preparations. Key upcoming catalysts include Iran nuclear negotiations in Oman and potential Gaza ceasefire progress, which could ease broader tensions.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket · Atualizado
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