**Traders assign a 91.4% probability to “No” because no US ally has initiated or advanced an indigenous nuclear weapons program capable of yielding deliverable warheads before 2027.** South Korea and Japan maintain robust technical capacity and have seen public debate—driven by North Korean and Chinese nuclear expansion plus questions over extended US deterrence—but both remain NPT parties with strong official non-proliferation policies and no active weaponization efforts. Any decision to pursue weapons would face immediate US diplomatic pressure, IAEA safeguards, and domestic legal hurdles, while realistic timelines from decision to first test or deployment exceed the remaining 18 months. Recent developments, including continued US alliance consultations, New START’s expiration, and Iranian nuclear talks, have not altered this baseline. The market consensus therefore reflects the combination of treaty commitments, alliance structures, and the practical difficulty of rapid breakout by any close US partner.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourOui
$51,651 Vol.
$51,651 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
Oui
$51,651 Vol.
$51,651 Vol.
31 déc. 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Traders assign a 91.4% probability to “No” because no US ally has initiated or advanced an indigenous nuclear weapons program capable of yielding deliverable warheads before 2027.** South Korea and Japan maintain robust technical capacity and have seen public debate—driven by North Korean and Chinese nuclear expansion plus questions over extended US deterrence—but both remain NPT parties with strong official non-proliferation policies and no active weaponization efforts. Any decision to pursue weapons would face immediate US diplomatic pressure, IAEA safeguards, and domestic legal hurdles, while realistic timelines from decision to first test or deployment exceed the remaining 18 months. Recent developments, including continued US alliance consultations, New START’s expiration, and Iranian nuclear talks, have not altered this baseline. The market consensus therefore reflects the combination of treaty commitments, alliance structures, and the practical difficulty of rapid breakout by any close US partner.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Marché ouvert : Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volume
$51,651Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Traders assign a 91.4% probability to “No” because no US ally has initiated or advanced an indigenous nuclear weapons program capable of yielding deliverable warheads before 2027.** South Korea and Japan maintain robust technical capacity and have seen public debate—driven by North Korean and Chinese nuclear expansion plus questions over extended US deterrence—but both remain NPT parties with strong official non-proliferation policies and no active weaponization efforts. Any decision to pursue weapons would face immediate US diplomatic pressure, IAEA safeguards, and domestic legal hurdles, while realistic timelines from decision to first test or deployment exceed the remaining 18 months. Recent developments, including continued US alliance consultations, New START’s expiration, and Iranian nuclear talks, have not altered this baseline. The market consensus therefore reflects the combination of treaty commitments, alliance structures, and the practical difficulty of rapid breakout by any close US partner.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volume
$51,651Date de fin
31 déc. 2026Marché ouvert
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Traders assign a 91.4% probability to “No” because no US ally has initiated or advanced an indigenous nuclear weapons program capable of yielding deliverable warheads before 2027.** South Korea and Japan maintain robust technical capacity and have seen public debate—driven by North Korean and Chinese nuclear expansion plus questions over extended US deterrence—but both remain NPT parties with strong official non-proliferation policies and no active weaponization efforts. Any decision to pursue weapons would face immediate US diplomatic pressure, IAEA safeguards, and domestic legal hurdles, while realistic timelines from decision to first test or deployment exceed the remaining 18 months. Recent developments, including continued US alliance consultations, New START’s expiration, and Iranian nuclear talks, have not altered this baseline. The market consensus therefore reflects the combination of treaty commitments, alliance structures, and the practical difficulty of rapid breakout by any close US partner.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Questions fréquentes