Trader consensus heavily favors no Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, with 94% implied probability on "No," driven by the absence of verified intelligence, official threats, or naval deployments signaling such intent amid Israel-Iran tensions. Recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in October 2024 prompted sabotage speculation, but Tehran has prioritized missile and proxy responses—like Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea—without direct cable actions. No primary sources confirm Iranian submarine activity near key Gulf or global cable routes, and past incidents elsewhere (Baltic, Red Sea) lack Tehran links. Traders weigh Iran's limited deep-sea capabilities and escalation risks against diplomatic de-escalation signals.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jourL'Iran sabotera-t-il les câbles Internet sous-marins d'ici le 30 avril ?
L'Iran sabotera-t-il les câbles Internet sous-marins d'ici le 30 avril ?
Oui
Oui
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus heavily favors no Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, with 94% implied probability on "No," driven by the absence of verified intelligence, official threats, or naval deployments signaling such intent amid Israel-Iran tensions. Recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in October 2024 prompted sabotage speculation, but Tehran has prioritized missile and proxy responses—like Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea—without direct cable actions. No primary sources confirm Iranian submarine activity near key Gulf or global cable routes, and past incidents elsewhere (Baltic, Red Sea) lack Tehran links. Traders weigh Iran's limited deep-sea capabilities and escalation risks against diplomatic de-escalation signals.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket · Mis à jour
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