**Traders see little prospect of a finalized U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, given the absence of a concluded peace framework.** Negotiations under the Trump administration have centered on linking any binding commitments—politically or legally enforceable—to a ceasefire and territorial concessions, particularly in Donbas, which remain unresolved. Earlier bilateral security agreements and the January 2026 Paris Declaration outlined principles for post-ceasefire support, including U.S.-led monitoring and response commitments, yet these have not advanced to a ratifiable accord. Recent U.S. actions emphasize continued military sales and sanctions rather than treaty-level guarantees, while congressional ratification timelines make near-term completion improbable absent major diplomatic breakthroughs.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · ОбновленоU.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
U.S. agrees to give Ukraine security guarantee by December 31?
6% вероятность
$38,727 Объем
$38,727 Объем
31 дек. 2026 г.
6% вероятность
$38,727 Объем
$38,727 Объем
31 дек. 2026 г.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders see little prospect of a finalized U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, given the absence of a concluded peace framework.** Negotiations under the Trump administration have centered on linking any binding commitments—politically or legally enforceable—to a ceasefire and territorial concessions, particularly in Donbas, which remain unresolved. Earlier bilateral security agreements and the January 2026 Paris Declaration outlined principles for post-ceasefire support, including U.S.-led monitoring and response commitments, yet these have not advanced to a ratifiable accord. Recent U.S. actions emphasize continued military sales and sanctions rather than treaty-level guarantees, while congressional ratification timelines make near-term completion improbable absent major diplomatic breakthroughs.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Открытие рынка: May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ET
Объем
$38,727Дата окончания
1 янв. 2027 г.Открытие рынка
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETКто определяет исход
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.**Traders see little prospect of a finalized U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, given the absence of a concluded peace framework.** Negotiations under the Trump administration have centered on linking any binding commitments—politically or legally enforceable—to a ceasefire and territorial concessions, particularly in Donbas, which remain unresolved. Earlier bilateral security agreements and the January 2026 Paris Declaration outlined principles for post-ceasefire support, including U.S.-led monitoring and response commitments, yet these have not advanced to a ratifiable accord. Recent U.S. actions emphasize continued military sales and sanctions rather than treaty-level guarantees, while congressional ratification timelines make near-term completion improbable absent major diplomatic breakthroughs.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine, which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024, US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements that are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Объем
$38,727Дата окончания
1 янв. 2027 г.Открытие рынка
May 28, 2026, 3:39 PM ETКто определяет исход
0x65070BE91...**Traders see little prospect of a finalized U.S. security guarantee for Ukraine by December 31, 2026, given the absence of a concluded peace framework.** Negotiations under the Trump administration have centered on linking any binding commitments—politically or legally enforceable—to a ceasefire and territorial concessions, particularly in Donbas, which remain unresolved. Earlier bilateral security agreements and the January 2026 Paris Declaration outlined principles for post-ceasefire support, including U.S.-led monitoring and response commitments, yet these have not advanced to a ratifiable accord. Recent U.S. actions emphasize continued military sales and sanctions rather than treaty-level guarantees, while congressional ratification timelines make near-term completion improbable absent major diplomatic breakthroughs.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
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