**Traders assign a 93.2% probability to “No” largely because no US ally has initiated an active nuclear weapons program or crossed key technical thresholds in the brief window remaining before 2027.** South Korea and Japan, the allies most frequently cited in proliferation debates, continue to reaffirm reliance on US extended deterrence through bilateral and trilateral dialogues, while publicly rejecting independent arsenals. Recent US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreements focus on peaceful fuel-cycle activities under IAEA safeguards, which could shorten future breakout timelines but do not equate to weaponization decisions. Poland and other NATO members have raised nuclear-sharing or hosting questions, yet these remain within alliance frameworks rather than sovereign programs. Domestic political support for arming exists in parts of South Korea, but governments prioritize alliance modernization and nonproliferation commitments. The compressed timeline, combined with NPT obligations, verification requirements, and the absence of announced breakout plans, sustains the strong market consensus against acquisition before 2027.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · ActualizadoSí
7% probabilidad
$163,271 Vol.
$163,271 Vol.
31 dic 2026
Sí
7% probabilidad
$163,271 Vol.
$163,271 Vol.
31 dic 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Traders assign a 93.2% probability to “No” largely because no US ally has initiated an active nuclear weapons program or crossed key technical thresholds in the brief window remaining before 2027.** South Korea and Japan, the allies most frequently cited in proliferation debates, continue to reaffirm reliance on US extended deterrence through bilateral and trilateral dialogues, while publicly rejecting independent arsenals. Recent US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreements focus on peaceful fuel-cycle activities under IAEA safeguards, which could shorten future breakout timelines but do not equate to weaponization decisions. Poland and other NATO members have raised nuclear-sharing or hosting questions, yet these remain within alliance frameworks rather than sovereign programs. Domestic political support for arming exists in parts of South Korea, but governments prioritize alliance modernization and nonproliferation commitments. The compressed timeline, combined with NPT obligations, verification requirements, and the absence of announced breakout plans, sustains the strong market consensus against acquisition before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Mercado abierto: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volumen
$163,271Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Traders assign a 93.2% probability to “No” largely because no US ally has initiated an active nuclear weapons program or crossed key technical thresholds in the brief window remaining before 2027.** South Korea and Japan, the allies most frequently cited in proliferation debates, continue to reaffirm reliance on US extended deterrence through bilateral and trilateral dialogues, while publicly rejecting independent arsenals. Recent US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreements focus on peaceful fuel-cycle activities under IAEA safeguards, which could shorten future breakout timelines but do not equate to weaponization decisions. Poland and other NATO members have raised nuclear-sharing or hosting questions, yet these remain within alliance frameworks rather than sovereign programs. Domestic political support for arming exists in parts of South Korea, but governments prioritize alliance modernization and nonproliferation commitments. The compressed timeline, combined with NPT obligations, verification requirements, and the absence of announced breakout plans, sustains the strong market consensus against acquisition before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volumen
$163,271Fecha de finalización
31 dic 2026Mercado abierto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Traders assign a 93.2% probability to “No” largely because no US ally has initiated an active nuclear weapons program or crossed key technical thresholds in the brief window remaining before 2027.** South Korea and Japan, the allies most frequently cited in proliferation debates, continue to reaffirm reliance on US extended deterrence through bilateral and trilateral dialogues, while publicly rejecting independent arsenals. Recent US-ROK nuclear cooperation agreements focus on peaceful fuel-cycle activities under IAEA safeguards, which could shorten future breakout timelines but do not equate to weaponization decisions. Poland and other NATO members have raised nuclear-sharing or hosting questions, yet these remain within alliance frameworks rather than sovereign programs. Domestic political support for arming exists in parts of South Korea, but governments prioritize alliance modernization and nonproliferation commitments. The compressed timeline, combined with NPT obligations, verification requirements, and the absence of announced breakout plans, sustains the strong market consensus against acquisition before 2027.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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