US extended deterrence commitments and alliance structures continue to anchor nonproliferation among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and NATO members, with no verified national programs advancing toward independent nuclear acquisition. Recent diplomatic signaling and domestic debates in allied capitals reflect hedging amid regional threats, yet these remain far from concrete decisions or technical milestones that could yield operational weapons by 2027. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, combined with US security assurances and the multi-year timelines required for fissile material production and weaponization, sustains trader consensus around the low likelihood of such an outcome. Scheduled alliance consultations and ongoing conventional capability enhancements further reinforce expectations that proliferation thresholds will not be crossed in the near term.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日はい
$51,592 Vol.
$51,592 Vol.
2026/12/31
はい
$51,592 Vol.
$51,592 Vol.
2026/12/31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments and alliance structures continue to anchor nonproliferation among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and NATO members, with no verified national programs advancing toward independent nuclear acquisition. Recent diplomatic signaling and domestic debates in allied capitals reflect hedging amid regional threats, yet these remain far from concrete decisions or technical milestones that could yield operational weapons by 2027. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, combined with US security assurances and the multi-year timelines required for fissile material production and weaponization, sustains trader consensus around the low likelihood of such an outcome. Scheduled alliance consultations and ongoing conventional capability enhancements further reinforce expectations that proliferation thresholds will not be crossed in the near term.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
マーケット開始日： Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
音量
$51,592終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments and alliance structures continue to anchor nonproliferation among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and NATO members, with no verified national programs advancing toward independent nuclear acquisition. Recent diplomatic signaling and domestic debates in allied capitals reflect hedging amid regional threats, yet these remain far from concrete decisions or technical milestones that could yield operational weapons by 2027. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, combined with US security assurances and the multi-year timelines required for fissile material production and weaponization, sustains trader consensus around the low likelihood of such an outcome. Scheduled alliance consultations and ongoing conventional capability enhancements further reinforce expectations that proliferation thresholds will not be crossed in the near term.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
音量
$51,592終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...US extended deterrence commitments and alliance structures continue to anchor nonproliferation among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and NATO members, with no verified national programs advancing toward independent nuclear acquisition. Recent diplomatic signaling and domestic debates in allied capitals reflect hedging amid regional threats, yet these remain far from concrete decisions or technical milestones that could yield operational weapons by 2027. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, combined with US security assurances and the multi-year timelines required for fissile material production and weaponization, sustains trader consensus around the low likelihood of such an outcome. Scheduled alliance consultations and ongoing conventional capability enhancements further reinforce expectations that proliferation thresholds will not be crossed in the near term.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日
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