**No** at 93.2% reflects the extended timelines required for any non-nuclear US ally to develop, test, and field independent nuclear weapons. South Korea and Saudi Arabia have advanced civilian nuclear cooperation with Washington, including a July 2026 US-Saudi agreement permitting uranium enrichment for power generation, yet experts note that converting such capabilities into deliverable warheads would require years of additional work on fissile material production, weaponization, and delivery systems, plus overcoming NPT commitments and international monitoring. US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed in recent National Defense Strategy documents and alliance dialogues, continue to reduce incentives for “friendly proliferation.” No ally has conducted tests or announced operational programs that could reach completion before 2027, and structural barriers such as production infrastructure and diplomatic constraints remain firmly in place.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日はい
7% 確率
$163,271 Vol.
$163,271 Vol.
2026/12/31
はい
7% 確率
$163,271 Vol.
$163,271 Vol.
2026/12/31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**No** at 93.2% reflects the extended timelines required for any non-nuclear US ally to develop, test, and field independent nuclear weapons. South Korea and Saudi Arabia have advanced civilian nuclear cooperation with Washington, including a July 2026 US-Saudi agreement permitting uranium enrichment for power generation, yet experts note that converting such capabilities into deliverable warheads would require years of additional work on fissile material production, weaponization, and delivery systems, plus overcoming NPT commitments and international monitoring. US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed in recent National Defense Strategy documents and alliance dialogues, continue to reduce incentives for “friendly proliferation.” No ally has conducted tests or announced operational programs that could reach completion before 2027, and structural barriers such as production infrastructure and diplomatic constraints remain firmly in place.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
マーケット開始日： Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
音量
$163,271終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**No** at 93.2% reflects the extended timelines required for any non-nuclear US ally to develop, test, and field independent nuclear weapons. South Korea and Saudi Arabia have advanced civilian nuclear cooperation with Washington, including a July 2026 US-Saudi agreement permitting uranium enrichment for power generation, yet experts note that converting such capabilities into deliverable warheads would require years of additional work on fissile material production, weaponization, and delivery systems, plus overcoming NPT commitments and international monitoring. US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed in recent National Defense Strategy documents and alliance dialogues, continue to reduce incentives for “friendly proliferation.” No ally has conducted tests or announced operational programs that could reach completion before 2027, and structural barriers such as production infrastructure and diplomatic constraints remain firmly in place.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
音量
$163,271終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**No** at 93.2% reflects the extended timelines required for any non-nuclear US ally to develop, test, and field independent nuclear weapons. South Korea and Saudi Arabia have advanced civilian nuclear cooperation with Washington, including a July 2026 US-Saudi agreement permitting uranium enrichment for power generation, yet experts note that converting such capabilities into deliverable warheads would require years of additional work on fissile material production, weaponization, and delivery systems, plus overcoming NPT commitments and international monitoring. US extended deterrence commitments, reaffirmed in recent National Defense Strategy documents and alliance dialogues, continue to reduce incentives for “friendly proliferation.” No ally has conducted tests or announced operational programs that could reach completion before 2027, and structural barriers such as production infrastructure and diplomatic constraints remain firmly in place.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日
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