US extended deterrence commitments, reinforced through NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements and bilateral security pacts with Pacific allies, continue to discourage independent nuclear programs among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The February 2026 expiration of New START has prompted renewed discussions of proliferation risks in allied capitals, yet no ally has initiated or accelerated weaponization efforts within the short timeline to 2027. Ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations and US modernization of its own arsenal further signal sustained nonproliferation pressure. Technical, diplomatic, and treaty barriers remain significant, with any shift requiring major policy reversals or acute regional crises that have not materialized. Late-breaking developments, such as abrupt alliance strains, could still alter trajectories.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日はい
$143,611 Vol.
$143,611 Vol.
2026/12/31
はい
$143,611 Vol.
$143,611 Vol.
2026/12/31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments, reinforced through NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements and bilateral security pacts with Pacific allies, continue to discourage independent nuclear programs among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The February 2026 expiration of New START has prompted renewed discussions of proliferation risks in allied capitals, yet no ally has initiated or accelerated weaponization efforts within the short timeline to 2027. Ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations and US modernization of its own arsenal further signal sustained nonproliferation pressure. Technical, diplomatic, and treaty barriers remain significant, with any shift requiring major policy reversals or acute regional crises that have not materialized. Late-breaking developments, such as abrupt alliance strains, could still alter trajectories.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
マーケット開始日： Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
音量
$143,611終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments, reinforced through NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements and bilateral security pacts with Pacific allies, continue to discourage independent nuclear programs among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The February 2026 expiration of New START has prompted renewed discussions of proliferation risks in allied capitals, yet no ally has initiated or accelerated weaponization efforts within the short timeline to 2027. Ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations and US modernization of its own arsenal further signal sustained nonproliferation pressure. Technical, diplomatic, and treaty barriers remain significant, with any shift requiring major policy reversals or acute regional crises that have not materialized. Late-breaking developments, such as abrupt alliance strains, could still alter trajectories.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
音量
$143,611終了日
2026/12/31マーケット開始日
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...US extended deterrence commitments, reinforced through NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements and bilateral security pacts with Pacific allies, continue to discourage independent nuclear programs among partners such as South Korea, Japan, and Australia. The February 2026 expiration of New START has prompted renewed discussions of proliferation risks in allied capitals, yet no ally has initiated or accelerated weaponization efforts within the short timeline to 2027. Ongoing US-Iran nuclear negotiations and US modernization of its own arsenal further signal sustained nonproliferation pressure. Technical, diplomatic, and treaty barriers remain significant, with any shift requiring major policy reversals or acute regional crises that have not materialized. Late-breaking developments, such as abrupt alliance strains, could still alter trajectories.
Polymarketデータを参照したAI生成の実験的な要約。これは取引アドバイスではなく、このマーケットの解決方法には一切関係ありません。 · 更新日
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