Trump administration negotiations for a bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine—envisioned as a NATO Article 5-style mutual defense commitment—remain stalled without a formal, publicly announced agreement, driving the 90.5% "No" trader consensus ahead of the June 30 deadline. Zelenskyy's late March claims that U.S. offers hinge on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas parts were rebutted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who clarified guarantees would only activate post-ceasefire, amid Putin's insistence on territorial concessions. Recent April interviews underscore the impasse, with Ukraine rejecting such linkage as effectively demanding capitulation, while U.S. aid cuts under Vice President Vance signal limited commitment. Russian battlefield gains, like the Pokrovsk siege, further dim prospects for resolution, though envoy visits could shift dynamics.
Polymarket 데이터를 참조하는 실험적 AI 생성 요약입니다. 이것은 거래 조언이 아니며 이 마켓의 정산에 영향을 미치지 않습니다. · 업데이트$139,553 거래량
$139,553 거래량
2026.12.31
$139,553 거래량
$139,553 거래량
2026.12.31
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trump administration negotiations for a bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine—envisioned as a NATO Article 5-style mutual defense commitment—remain stalled without a formal, publicly announced agreement, driving the 90.5% "No" trader consensus ahead of the June 30 deadline. Zelenskyy's late March claims that U.S. offers hinge on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas parts were rebutted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who clarified guarantees would only activate post-ceasefire, amid Putin's insistence on territorial concessions. Recent April interviews underscore the impasse, with Ukraine rejecting such linkage as effectively demanding capitulation, while U.S. aid cuts under Vice President Vance signal limited commitment. Russian battlefield gains, like the Pokrovsk siege, further dim prospects for resolution, though envoy visits could shift dynamics.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
마켓 개설일: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
거래량
$139,553종료일
2026.06.30마켓 개설일
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trump administration negotiations for a bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine—envisioned as a NATO Article 5-style mutual defense commitment—remain stalled without a formal, publicly announced agreement, driving the 90.5% "No" trader consensus ahead of the June 30 deadline. Zelenskyy's late March claims that U.S. offers hinge on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas parts were rebutted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who clarified guarantees would only activate post-ceasefire, amid Putin's insistence on territorial concessions. Recent April interviews underscore the impasse, with Ukraine rejecting such linkage as effectively demanding capitulation, while U.S. aid cuts under Vice President Vance signal limited commitment. Russian battlefield gains, like the Pokrovsk siege, further dim prospects for resolution, though envoy visits could shift dynamics.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
거래량
$139,553종료일
2026.12.31마켓 개설일
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trump administration negotiations for a bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine—envisioned as a NATO Article 5-style mutual defense commitment—remain stalled without a formal, publicly announced agreement, driving the 90.5% "No" trader consensus ahead of the June 30 deadline. Zelenskyy's late March claims that U.S. offers hinge on Kyiv withdrawing from unoccupied Donbas parts were rebutted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who clarified guarantees would only activate post-ceasefire, amid Putin's insistence on territorial concessions. Recent April interviews underscore the impasse, with Ukraine rejecting such linkage as effectively demanding capitulation, while U.S. aid cuts under Vice President Vance signal limited commitment. Russian battlefield gains, like the Pokrovsk siege, further dim prospects for resolution, though envoy visits could shift dynamics.
Polymarket 데이터를 참조하는 실험적 AI 생성 요약입니다. 이것은 거래 조언이 아니며 이 마켓의 정산에 영향을 미치지 않습니다. · 업데이트
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