**Recent stalled progress on the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and Board of Peace (BoP) under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 continues to shape expectations around foreign intervention in Gaza.** The November 2025 resolution authorized an international force and transitional governance to support demilitarization, security handover, and reconstruction after the October 2025 ceasefire, but deployment remains delayed as of mid-2026. Israel has expanded its control west of the agreed “Yellow Line” to roughly 60 percent of the territory, conducted targeted strikes killing senior Hamas figures in May, and signaled intent to reach 70 percent control, while Hamas links full disarmament to complete Israeli withdrawal. Mediators including Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey are facilitating Cairo talks on the second phase, yet contributor commitments for the ISF stay limited amid Israeli objections and mandate uncertainties. These dynamics—slow diplomatic movement, ongoing low-level violations, and competing territorial pressures—define the current environment for any resolution on external stabilization involvement.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour$649,502 Vol.

30 juin
6%
$649,502 Vol.

30 juin
6%
The foreign personnel must physically enter the terrestrial territory of the Gaza Strip to qualify. Entering the maritime territory, as occurred during the US’s attempt to construct a floating pier in 2024, or entering the airspace will not qualify.
Entering Israeli controlled buffer zones will not qualify.
Egyptian or other forces operating solely along the Egyptian/Gaza border will not qualify regardless of if they cross the border.
Foreign personnel carrying out individual special operations, diplomatic missions, or solely humanitarian operations will not qualify.
Qualifying deployments must involve active-duty personnel of at least one foreign state or international institution (e.g., the UN or multinational missions) who are officially sent to Gaza for an operational role (e.g., peacekeeping, convoy escort, detention, logistical support). To qualify, the deployment must occur within the specified timeframe; mere announcements will not suffice.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Marché ouvert : Feb 18, 2026, 6:39 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...The foreign personnel must physically enter the terrestrial territory of the Gaza Strip to qualify. Entering the maritime territory, as occurred during the US’s attempt to construct a floating pier in 2024, or entering the airspace will not qualify.
Entering Israeli controlled buffer zones will not qualify.
Egyptian or other forces operating solely along the Egyptian/Gaza border will not qualify regardless of if they cross the border.
Foreign personnel carrying out individual special operations, diplomatic missions, or solely humanitarian operations will not qualify.
Qualifying deployments must involve active-duty personnel of at least one foreign state or international institution (e.g., the UN or multinational missions) who are officially sent to Gaza for an operational role (e.g., peacekeeping, convoy escort, detention, logistical support). To qualify, the deployment must occur within the specified timeframe; mere announcements will not suffice.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...**Recent stalled progress on the International Stabilization Force (ISF) and Board of Peace (BoP) under UN Security Council Resolution 2803 continues to shape expectations around foreign intervention in Gaza.** The November 2025 resolution authorized an international force and transitional governance to support demilitarization, security handover, and reconstruction after the October 2025 ceasefire, but deployment remains delayed as of mid-2026. Israel has expanded its control west of the agreed “Yellow Line” to roughly 60 percent of the territory, conducted targeted strikes killing senior Hamas figures in May, and signaled intent to reach 70 percent control, while Hamas links full disarmament to complete Israeli withdrawal. Mediators including Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey are facilitating Cairo talks on the second phase, yet contributor commitments for the ISF stay limited amid Israeli objections and mandate uncertainties. These dynamics—slow diplomatic movement, ongoing low-level violations, and competing territorial pressures—define the current environment for any resolution on external stabilization involvement.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Questions fréquentes