**Trader consensus on the low likelihood of a US ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027 stems from substantial technical, political, and diplomatic barriers despite ongoing regional security debates.** South Korea and Japan have seen heightened public and elite discussion of independent capabilities or expanded nuclear sharing amid North Korea's arsenal growth and questions about extended deterrence, including 2025 polls showing strong South Korean support and statements from officials. However, current South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has dismissed independent armament as impractical and pursued diplomacy, while Japan maintains its three non-nuclear principles. Poland has explored options like French extended deterrence or hosting US weapons but described any path to its own arsenal as lengthy. US approvals for South Korean nuclear-powered submarines and limited fuel-cycle work focus on energy and conventional capabilities rather than weapons production. With only months remaining until 2027, the absence of confirmed programs, tests, or rapid breakout scenarios supports the 92.7% implied probability on "No."
Tóm tắt AI thử nghiệm tham chiếu dữ liệu Polymarket. Đây không phải tư vấn giao dịch và không ảnh hưởng đến cách thị trường này được giải quyết. · Cập nhật$136,251 KL.
$136,251 KL.
Dec 31, 2026
$136,251 KL.
$136,251 KL.
Dec 31, 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Trader consensus on the low likelihood of a US ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027 stems from substantial technical, political, and diplomatic barriers despite ongoing regional security debates.** South Korea and Japan have seen heightened public and elite discussion of independent capabilities or expanded nuclear sharing amid North Korea's arsenal growth and questions about extended deterrence, including 2025 polls showing strong South Korean support and statements from officials. However, current South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has dismissed independent armament as impractical and pursued diplomacy, while Japan maintains its three non-nuclear principles. Poland has explored options like French extended deterrence or hosting US weapons but described any path to its own arsenal as lengthy. US approvals for South Korean nuclear-powered submarines and limited fuel-cycle work focus on energy and conventional capabilities rather than weapons production. With only months remaining until 2027, the absence of confirmed programs, tests, or rapid breakout scenarios supports the 92.7% implied probability on "No."
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Thị trường mở: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Khối lượng
$136,251Ngày kết thúc
Dec 31, 2026Thị trường mở
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Trader consensus on the low likelihood of a US ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027 stems from substantial technical, political, and diplomatic barriers despite ongoing regional security debates.** South Korea and Japan have seen heightened public and elite discussion of independent capabilities or expanded nuclear sharing amid North Korea's arsenal growth and questions about extended deterrence, including 2025 polls showing strong South Korean support and statements from officials. However, current South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has dismissed independent armament as impractical and pursued diplomacy, while Japan maintains its three non-nuclear principles. Poland has explored options like French extended deterrence or hosting US weapons but described any path to its own arsenal as lengthy. US approvals for South Korean nuclear-powered submarines and limited fuel-cycle work focus on energy and conventional capabilities rather than weapons production. With only months remaining until 2027, the absence of confirmed programs, tests, or rapid breakout scenarios supports the 92.7% implied probability on "No."
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Khối lượng
$136,251Ngày kết thúc
Dec 31, 2026Thị trường mở
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Trader consensus on the low likelihood of a US ally acquiring a nuclear weapon before 2027 stems from substantial technical, political, and diplomatic barriers despite ongoing regional security debates.** South Korea and Japan have seen heightened public and elite discussion of independent capabilities or expanded nuclear sharing amid North Korea's arsenal growth and questions about extended deterrence, including 2025 polls showing strong South Korean support and statements from officials. However, current South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has dismissed independent armament as impractical and pursued diplomacy, while Japan maintains its three non-nuclear principles. Poland has explored options like French extended deterrence or hosting US weapons but described any path to its own arsenal as lengthy. US approvals for South Korean nuclear-powered submarines and limited fuel-cycle work focus on energy and conventional capabilities rather than weapons production. With only months remaining until 2027, the absence of confirmed programs, tests, or rapid breakout scenarios supports the 92.7% implied probability on "No."
Tóm tắt AI thử nghiệm tham chiếu dữ liệu Polymarket. Đây không phải tư vấn giao dịch và không ảnh hưởng đến cách thị trường này được giải quyết. · Cập nhật
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