**The extremely short resolution window through December 31, 2026, underpins the 95.9% trader consensus on “No.”** Acquiring nuclear weapons requires sequential steps—policy decisions, fissile material production or diversion, weaponization, and integration with delivery systems—that established nonproliferation assessments show take years even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. US allies such as South Korea and Japan face public and elite debates over extended deterrence reliability amid North Korean and Chinese capabilities, yet these remain at the level of polling and policy discussion without announced weaponization programs, fissile ramps, or deployments feasible before year-end. Existing nuclear-armed allies (UK, France) and Israel’s pre-2025 capability fall outside the market’s definition of new acquisition. Structural factors including NPT commitments, US alliance frameworks, and international safeguards further constrain rapid change. The only plausible shifts would involve an unforeseen crisis enabling near-instant revelation or assembly, developments that remain absent from verified reporting.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於是
4% 機率
$211,330 交易量
$211,330 交易量
2026-12-31
是
4% 機率
$211,330 交易量
$211,330 交易量
2026-12-31
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**The extremely short resolution window through December 31, 2026, underpins the 95.9% trader consensus on “No.”** Acquiring nuclear weapons requires sequential steps—policy decisions, fissile material production or diversion, weaponization, and integration with delivery systems—that established nonproliferation assessments show take years even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. US allies such as South Korea and Japan face public and elite debates over extended deterrence reliability amid North Korean and Chinese capabilities, yet these remain at the level of polling and policy discussion without announced weaponization programs, fissile ramps, or deployments feasible before year-end. Existing nuclear-armed allies (UK, France) and Israel’s pre-2025 capability fall outside the market’s definition of new acquisition. Structural factors including NPT commitments, US alliance frameworks, and international safeguards further constrain rapid change. The only plausible shifts would involve an unforeseen crisis enabling near-instant revelation or assembly, developments that remain absent from verified reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
市場開放時間： Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
交易量
$211,330結束日期
2027-01-01市場開放時間
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETThis market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**The extremely short resolution window through December 31, 2026, underpins the 95.9% trader consensus on “No.”** Acquiring nuclear weapons requires sequential steps—policy decisions, fissile material production or diversion, weaponization, and integration with delivery systems—that established nonproliferation assessments show take years even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. US allies such as South Korea and Japan face public and elite debates over extended deterrence reliability amid North Korean and Chinese capabilities, yet these remain at the level of polling and policy discussion without announced weaponization programs, fissile ramps, or deployments feasible before year-end. Existing nuclear-armed allies (UK, France) and Israel’s pre-2025 capability fall outside the market’s definition of new acquisition. Structural factors including NPT commitments, US alliance frameworks, and international safeguards further constrain rapid change. The only plausible shifts would involve an unforeseen crisis enabling near-instant revelation or assembly, developments that remain absent from verified reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
交易量
$211,330結束日期
2027-01-01市場開放時間
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET**The extremely short resolution window through December 31, 2026, underpins the 95.9% trader consensus on “No.”** Acquiring nuclear weapons requires sequential steps—policy decisions, fissile material production or diversion, weaponization, and integration with delivery systems—that established nonproliferation assessments show take years even for states with advanced civilian nuclear infrastructure. US allies such as South Korea and Japan face public and elite debates over extended deterrence reliability amid North Korean and Chinese capabilities, yet these remain at the level of polling and policy discussion without announced weaponization programs, fissile ramps, or deployments feasible before year-end. Existing nuclear-armed allies (UK, France) and Israel’s pre-2025 capability fall outside the market’s definition of new acquisition. Structural factors including NPT commitments, US alliance frameworks, and international safeguards further constrain rapid change. The only plausible shifts would involve an unforeseen crisis enabling near-instant revelation or assembly, developments that remain absent from verified reporting.
基於Polymarket數據的AI實驗性摘要。這不是交易建議，也不影響該市場的結算方式。 · 更新於
警惕外部連結哦。
警惕外部連結哦。
Frequently Asked Questions