As the April 30 deadline passed without any verified sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or its proxies, trader consensus on Polymarket reflects 100% implied probability for "No," driven by the absence of confirmed incidents amid heightened regional tensions. Recent IRGC-linked reports from Tasnim News, around April 22–28, mapped critical submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, signaling potential vulnerabilities as leverage in the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict, yet no military action or disruptions materialized despite prior Red Sea precedents by Houthis. High confidence stems from Iran's restraint to avoid broader escalation, with repair ships unhindered and global connectivity intact; late attributions of damage remain a remote possibility but would require unambiguous evidence for any market challenge.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
¿Irán saboteará los cables submarinos de Internet antes del 30 de abril?
Sí
<1% probabilidad
$204,531 Vol.
$204,531 Vol.
29 abr 2026
Sí
<1% probabilidad
$204,531 Vol.
$204,531 Vol.
29 abr 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.As the April 30 deadline passed without any verified sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or its proxies, trader consensus on Polymarket reflects 100% implied probability for "No," driven by the absence of confirmed incidents amid heightened regional tensions. Recent IRGC-linked reports from Tasnim News, around April 22–28, mapped critical submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, signaling potential vulnerabilities as leverage in the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict, yet no military action or disruptions materialized despite prior Red Sea precedents by Houthis. High confidence stems from Iran's restraint to avoid broader escalation, with repair ships unhindered and global connectivity intact; late attributions of damage remain a remote possibility but would require unambiguous evidence for any market challenge.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercado abierto: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Volumen
$204,531Fecha de finalización
30 abr 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Resultado propuesto: No
Sin disputa
Resultado final: No
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.As the April 30 deadline passed without any verified sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or its proxies, trader consensus on Polymarket reflects 100% implied probability for "No," driven by the absence of confirmed incidents amid heightened regional tensions. Recent IRGC-linked reports from Tasnim News, around April 22–28, mapped critical submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, signaling potential vulnerabilities as leverage in the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict, yet no military action or disruptions materialized despite prior Red Sea precedents by Houthis. High confidence stems from Iran's restraint to avoid broader escalation, with repair ships unhindered and global connectivity intact; late attributions of damage remain a remote possibility but would require unambiguous evidence for any market challenge.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volumen
$204,531Fecha de finalización
30 abr 2026Mercado abierto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Resultado propuesto: No
Sin disputa
Resultado final: No
As the April 30 deadline passed without any verified sabotage of undersea internet cables by Iran or its proxies, trader consensus on Polymarket reflects 100% implied probability for "No," driven by the absence of confirmed incidents amid heightened regional tensions. Recent IRGC-linked reports from Tasnim News, around April 22–28, mapped critical submarine cables in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, signaling potential vulnerabilities as leverage in the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict, yet no military action or disruptions materialized despite prior Red Sea precedents by Houthis. High confidence stems from Iran's restraint to avoid broader escalation, with repair ships unhindered and global connectivity intact; late attributions of damage remain a remote possibility but would require unambiguous evidence for any market challenge.
Resumen experimental generado por IA con datos de Polymarket. Esto no es asesoramiento de trading y no influye en cómo se resuelve este mercado. · Actualizado
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Cuidado con los enlaces externos.
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