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Politica·Trump-Zelenskyy

Gli Stati Uniti accettano di dare garanzia di sicurezza all'Ucraina entro il 30 giugno?

Market icon
Politica·Trump-Zelenskyy

Gli Stati Uniti accettano di dare garanzia di sicurezza all'Ucraina entro il 30 giugno?

giu 30

giu 30

Sì

10% probabilità
Polymarket

$139,553 Vol.

Sì

10% probabilità
Polymarket

$139,553 Vol.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket prices "No" at 90.5% for a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement akin to the 2024 pact by June 30, driven by stalled diplomatic talks under President Trump. Zelensky stated on March 25 that the U.S. conditions guarantees on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia—a nonstarter for Ukraine that would weaken frontline defenses—halting progress despite earlier January claims of a "100% ready" document. An April 3 announcement of imminent finalization yielded no signing, amid disputes over duration (U.S. offering 15 years versus Ukraine's push for 20+) and linkage to a broader peace deal. With roughly 75 days left, Trump's focus on European burden-sharing and reduced aid via the FY2026 NDAA underscores significant barriers to resolution.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$139,553
Data di fine
30 giu 2026
Mercato aperto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket prices "No" at 90.5% for a U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement akin to the 2024 pact by June 30, driven by stalled diplomatic talks under President Trump. Zelensky stated on March 25 that the U.S. conditions guarantees on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia—a nonstarter for Ukraine that would weaken frontline defenses—halting progress despite earlier January claims of a "100% ready" document. An April 3 announcement of imminent finalization yielded no signing, amid disputes over duration (U.S. offering 15 years versus Ukraine's push for 20+) and linkage to a broader peace deal. With roughly 75 days left, Trump's focus on European burden-sharing and reduced aid via the FY2026 NDAA underscores significant barriers to resolution.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”

A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.

Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.

A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.

The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$139,553
Data di fine
31 dic 2026
Mercato aperto
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET

Resolver

0x65070BE91...
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.” A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify. Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees. A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count. The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.

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"Gli Stati Uniti accettano di dare garanzia di sicurezza all'Ucraina entro il 30 giugno? " è un mercato predittivo su Polymarket con 2 possibili esiti dove i trader comprano e vendono azioni in base a ciò che credono accadrà. L'esito attualmente in testa è "Gli Stati Uniti accettano di concedere all'Ucraina una garanzia di sicurezza entro il 30 giugno?" a 10%. I prezzi riflettono probabilità aggregate in tempo reale. Ad esempio, un'azione quotata a 10¢ implica che il mercato assegna collettivamente una probabilità di 10% a quell'esito. Queste quote cambiano continuamente man mano che i trader reagiscono a nuovi sviluppi e informazioni. Le azioni nell'esito corretto possono essere riscattate per $1 ciascuna alla risoluzione del mercato.

Ad oggi, "Gli Stati Uniti accettano di dare garanzia di sicurezza all'Ucraina entro il 30 giugno? " ha generato $139.6K in volume totale di trading dal lancio del mercato il Dec 28, 2025. Questo livello di attività di trading riflette un forte coinvolgimento della comunità Polymarket e contribuisce a garantire che le quote attuali siano informate da un ampio pool di partecipanti al mercato. Puoi seguire i movimenti di prezzo in tempo reale e fare trading su qualsiasi esito direttamente su questa pagina.

Per fare trading su "Gli Stati Uniti accettano di dare garanzia di sicurezza all'Ucraina entro il 30 giugno? ", esplora i 2 esiti disponibili elencati in questa pagina. Ogni esito mostra un prezzo corrente che rappresenta la probabilità implicita del mercato. Per prendere una posizione, seleziona l'esito che ritieni più probabile, scegli "Sì" per fare trading a suo favore o "No" per fare trading contro di esso, inserisci il tuo importo e clicca "Trading". Se il tuo esito scelto è corretto alla risoluzione del mercato, le tue azioni "Sì" pagano $1 ciascuna. Se è errato, pagano $0. Puoi anche vendere le tue azioni in qualsiasi momento prima della risoluzione se vuoi consolidare un profitto o limitare una perdita.

L'attuale favorito per "Gli Stati Uniti accettano di dare garanzia di sicurezza all'Ucraina entro il 30 giugno? " è "Gli Stati Uniti accettano di concedere all'Ucraina una garanzia di sicurezza entro il 30 giugno?" a 10%, il che significa che il mercato assegna una probabilità di 10% a quell'esito. Queste quote si aggiornano in tempo reale man mano che i trader comprano e vendono azioni, quindi riflettono l'ultima visione collettiva di ciò che è più probabile che accada. Controlla frequentemente o aggiungi questa pagina ai preferiti per seguire come cambiano le quote man mano che emergono nuove informazioni.

Le regole di risoluzione per "Gli Stati Uniti accettano di dare garanzia di sicurezza all'Ucraina entro il 30 giugno? " definiscono esattamente cosa deve accadere affinché ogni esito venga dichiarato vincitore — comprese le fonti di dati ufficiali utilizzate per determinare il risultato. Puoi consultare i criteri completi di risoluzione nella sezione "Regole" di questa pagina sopra i commenti. Ti consigliamo di leggere attentamente le regole prima di fare trading, poiché specificano le condizioni precise, i casi limite e le fonti che regolano come viene risolto questo mercato.