This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket assigns low probabilities to a Russian nuclear test in 2026, with December 31 leading at just 7%, reflecting no detonations since 1990 despite heightened rhetoric. In November 2025, President Putin ordered Defense Minister Belousov to prepare proposals for full-scale tests at Novaya Zemlya after U.S. President Trump signaled potential resumption of American testing, with Moscow conditioning action on reciprocal moves amid New START's February 2026 expiration. No tests have occurred by May 2026, as recent activity centers on Sarmat ICBM trials near Kazakhstan and non-weapon nuclear fuel experiments. Barriers include global non-proliferation norms and CTBT withdrawal without revival; escalation in Ukraine or U.S. tests could shift odds, with ongoing diplomacy monitoring for signals.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Trader consensus on Polymarket assigns low probabilities to a Russian nuclear test in 2026, with December 31 leading at just 7%, reflecting no detonations since 1990 despite heightened rhetoric. In November 2025, President Putin ordered Defense Minister Belousov to prepare proposals for full-scale tests at Novaya Zemlya after U.S. President Trump signaled potential resumption of American testing, with Moscow conditioning action on reciprocal moves amid New START's February 2026 expiration. No tests have occurred by May 2026, as recent activity centers on Sarmat ICBM trials near Kazakhstan and non-weapon nuclear fuel experiments. Barriers include global non-proliferation norms and CTBT withdrawal without revival; escalation in Ukraine or U.S. tests could shift odds, with ongoing diplomacy monitoring for signals.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
May 4 2026
Analysts cite the April‑May diplomatic pressure and Russia’s recent withdrawal from the CTBT (2023) as evidence that Moscow is unlikely to risk a test before the end‑of‑year
December 31, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Analysts cite the April‑May diplomatic pressure and Russia’s recent withdrawal from the CTBT (2023) as evidence that Moscow is unlikely to risk a test before the end‑of‑year deadline, pushing odds down to a single‑digit level
May 1 2026
U.S. Report to Congress on Russia’s nuclear weapons (USNI) states that “multiple failed tests of new systems” have forced Russia to postpone any further nuclear‑test programme
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
U.S. Report to Congress on Russia’s nuclear weapons (USNI) states that “multiple failed tests of new systems” have forced Russia to postpone any further nuclear‑test programme until technical issues are resolved
May 1 2026
Polymarket’s own odds commentary cites “Kremlin restraint statements” and the absence of CTBTO seismic data as reasons for the low probability of a Russian test before September
Polymarket’s own odds commentary cites “Kremlin restraint statements” and the absence of CTBTO seismic data as reasons for the low probability of a Russian test before September 30, further pushing the
Apr 30 2026
U.S. Congressional Research Service report (published May 1) reiterates that Russia’s “modernizing…in the face of multiple failed tests” and that no test has been announced
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%2%
U.S. Congressional Research Service report (published May 1) reiterates that Russia’s “modernizing…in the face of multiple failed tests” and that no test has been announced despite the New START expiry, reinforcing market belief that a test is unlikely
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 29 2026
U.N. CTBTO head repeats Grossi’s warning after a visit to Moscow, reporting that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “an unconstrained return to testing is not in any
December 31, 2026 drops to 12%10%
U.N. CTBTO head repeats Grossi’s warning after a visit to Moscow, reporting that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “an unconstrained return to testing is not in any state’s interest”
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 21 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would trigger a cascade of tests by other states, heightening diplomatic pressure on Moscow
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would trigger a cascade of tests by other states, heightening diplomatic pressure on Moscow to maintain its moratorium
Apr 21 2026
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia resumes testing “other nations will follow,” but notes that both the United States and Russia have publicly said they will respect
December 31, 2026 plunges to 22%16%
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia resumes testing “other nations will follow,” but notes that both the United States and Russia have publicly said they will respect the test‑ban for now
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Mar 31 2026
U.S. Intelligence’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment notes “multiple failed tests of new systems” by Russia, underscoring doubts about a near‑term test
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. Intelligence’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment notes “multiple failed tests of new systems” by Russia, underscoring doubts about a near‑term test
Mar 31 2026
Russia’s defence ministry reiterates commitment to nuclear‑test moratorium, citing “no operational need” and emphasizing focus on modernising existing warheads
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
Russia’s defence ministry reiterates commitment to nuclear‑test moratorium, citing “no operational need” and emphasizing focus on modernising existing warheads
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus on Polymarket assigns low probabilities to a Russian nuclear test in 2026, with December 31 leading at just 7%, reflecting no detonations since 1990 despite heightened rhetoric. In November 2025, President Putin ordered Defense Minister Belousov to prepare proposals for full-scale tests at Novaya Zemlya after U.S. President Trump signaled potential resumption of American testing, with Moscow conditioning action on reciprocal moves amid New START's February 2026 expiration. No tests have occurred by May 2026, as recent activity centers on Sarmat ICBM trials near Kazakhstan and non-weapon nuclear fuel experiments. Barriers include global non-proliferation norms and CTBT withdrawal without revival; escalation in Ukraine or U.S. tests could shift odds, with ongoing diplomacy monitoring for signals.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Russia conducts a nuclear test by the listed date (ET). Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
A nuclear test is defined as the intentional non-combat detonation of a device by Russia that produces a nuclear chain reaction (fission or fusion), regardless of yield.
Accidents, radiological dispersal devices (bombs that spread radioactive material using conventional explosives such as "dirty bombs"), or actions by third parties will not count toward this market's resolution.
Tests not explicitly claimed by Russia may still qualify if a clear consensus of credible reporting attributes the nuclear detonation to Russia. For example, an unclaimed nuclear test analogous to the 1979 "Vela Incident" would count if credible reporting attributes it to Russia.
The resolution source for this market will be a broad consensus of credible reporting.
Trader consensus on Polymarket assigns low probabilities to a Russian nuclear test in 2026, with December 31 leading at just 7%, reflecting no detonations since 1990 despite heightened rhetoric. In November 2025, President Putin ordered Defense Minister Belousov to prepare proposals for full-scale tests at Novaya Zemlya after U.S. President Trump signaled potential resumption of American testing, with Moscow conditioning action on reciprocal moves amid New START's February 2026 expiration. No tests have occurred by May 2026, as recent activity centers on Sarmat ICBM trials near Kazakhstan and non-weapon nuclear fuel experiments. Barriers include global non-proliferation norms and CTBT withdrawal without revival; escalation in Ukraine or U.S. tests could shift odds, with ongoing diplomacy monitoring for signals.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
May 4 2026
Analysts cite the April‑May diplomatic pressure and Russia’s recent withdrawal from the CTBT (2023) as evidence that Moscow is unlikely to risk a test before the end‑of‑year
December 31, 2026 dips to 6%2%
Analysts cite the April‑May diplomatic pressure and Russia’s recent withdrawal from the CTBT (2023) as evidence that Moscow is unlikely to risk a test before the end‑of‑year deadline, pushing odds down to a single‑digit level
May 1 2026
U.S. Report to Congress on Russia’s nuclear weapons (USNI) states that “multiple failed tests of new systems” have forced Russia to postpone any further nuclear‑test programme
December 31, 2026 dips to 8%4%
U.S. Report to Congress on Russia’s nuclear weapons (USNI) states that “multiple failed tests of new systems” have forced Russia to postpone any further nuclear‑test programme until technical issues are resolved
May 1 2026
Polymarket’s own odds commentary cites “Kremlin restraint statements” and the absence of CTBTO seismic data as reasons for the low probability of a Russian test before September
Polymarket’s own odds commentary cites “Kremlin restraint statements” and the absence of CTBTO seismic data as reasons for the low probability of a Russian test before September 30, further pushing the
Apr 30 2026
U.S. Congressional Research Service report (published May 1) reiterates that Russia’s “modernizing…in the face of multiple failed tests” and that no test has been announced
September 30, 2026 dips to 4%2%
U.S. Congressional Research Service report (published May 1) reiterates that Russia’s “modernizing…in the face of multiple failed tests” and that no test has been announced despite the New START expiry, reinforcing market belief that a test is unlikely
Apr 30 2026
Russian Defense Ministry reports successful training completion of Yars missile system driver-mechanics arriving for service
Routine personnel training for nuclear-capable missile systems indicated ongoing readiness but no test, supporting low market probabilities.
Apr 29 2026
U.N. CTBTO head repeats Grossi’s warning after a visit to Moscow, reporting that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “an unconstrained return to testing is not in any
December 31, 2026 drops to 12%10%
U.N. CTBTO head repeats Grossi’s warning after a visit to Moscow, reporting that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said “an unconstrained return to testing is not in any state’s interest”
Apr 27 2026
Russian forces launch massive missile and drone strikes against Ukraine, including attacks near the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant
Escalation in conventional strikes near nuclear sites raised concerns but no nuclear test occurred, maintaining low test probability.
Apr 21 2026
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would trigger a cascade of tests by other states, heightening diplomatic pressure on Moscow
September 30, 2026 dips to 6%3%
IAEA Director‑General Rafael Grossi warns that any nuclear test by Russia (or the U.S.) would trigger a cascade of tests by other states, heightening diplomatic pressure on Moscow to maintain its moratorium
Apr 21 2026
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia resumes testing “other nations will follow,” but notes that both the United States and Russia have publicly said they will respect
December 31, 2026 plunges to 22%16%
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi warns that if Russia resumes testing “other nations will follow,” but notes that both the United States and Russia have publicly said they will respect the test‑ban for now
Apr 2 2026
Russian Strategic Missile Forces conduct large-scale drills in Siberia involving Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads
June 30, 2026 plunges to 2%48%
Russia held major nuclear missile drills with Yars ICBMs, demonstrating nuclear readiness and signaling deterrence without conducting nuclear tests, contributing to a sharp drop in test probability.
Mar 31 2026
U.S. Intelligence’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment notes “multiple failed tests of new systems” by Russia, underscoring doubts about a near‑term test
September 30, 2026 plunges to 9%42%
U.S. Intelligence’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment notes “multiple failed tests of new systems” by Russia, underscoring doubts about a near‑term test
Mar 31 2026
Russia’s defence ministry reiterates commitment to nuclear‑test moratorium, citing “no operational need” and emphasizing focus on modernising existing warheads
December 31, 2026 drops to 38%12%
Russia’s defence ministry reiterates commitment to nuclear‑test moratorium, citing “no operational need” and emphasizing focus on modernising existing warheads
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Часто задаваемые вопросы
«Ядерное испытание России...?» — это рынок прогнозов на Polymarket с 6 возможными исходами, где трейдеры покупают и продают акции на основе своих прогнозов. Текущий лидирующий исход — «31 декабря 2026 года» с 6%, за ним следует «30 сентября 2026 года» с 4%. Цены отражают вероятности сообщества в реальном времени. Например, акция по цене 6¢ означает, что рынок коллективно оценивает вероятность этого исхода в 6%. Эти коэффициенты постоянно меняются. Акции правильного исхода можно обменять на $1 каждую при разрешении рынка.
На сегодняшний день «Ядерное испытание России...?» сгенерировал общий объём торгов $1.4 million с момента запуска рынка Nov 5, 2025. Такой уровень активности отражает высокую вовлечённость сообщества Polymarket и гарантирует, что текущие коэффициенты формируются широким кругом участников рынка. Ты можешь отслеживать движение цен в реальном времени и торговать любым исходом прямо на этой странице.
Чтобы торговать на «Ядерное испытание России...?», просмотри 6 доступных исходов на этой странице. Каждый исход показывает текущую цену, представляющую подразумеваемую вероятность рынка. Чтобы занять позицию, выбери исход, который считаешь наиболее вероятным, выбери «Да» для торговли в его пользу или «Нет» для торговли против, введи сумму и нажми «Торговать». Если твой выбранный исход окажется верным, твои акции «Да» принесут $1 каждая. Если нет — $0. Ты также можешь продать акции до разрешения.
Это очень открытый рынок. Текущий лидер для «Ядерное испытание России...?» — «31 декабря 2026 года» всего с 6%, а «30 сентября 2026 года» близко позади с 4%. Поскольку ни один исход не доминирует, трейдеры видят это как крайне неопределённую ситуацию, что может создавать уникальные торговые возможности. Эти коэффициенты обновляются в реальном времени, так что добавь эту страницу в закладки.
Правила разрешения «Ядерное испытание России...?» точно определяют, что должно произойти, чтобы каждый исход был объявлен победителем, включая официальные источники данных, используемые для определения результата. Ты можешь просмотреть полные критерии разрешения в разделе «Правила» на этой странице над комментариями. Мы рекомендуем внимательно прочитать правила перед торговлей, так как они определяют точные условия, особые случаи и источники.
Да. Тебе не нужно торговать, чтобы оставаться в курсе. Эта страница служит трекером в реальном времени для «Ядерное испытание России...?». Вероятности исходов обновляются в реальном времени по мере поступления новых сделок. Ты можешь добавить эту страницу в закладки и читать раздел комментариев, чтобы узнать мнение других трейдеров. Ты также можешь использовать фильтры временного диапазона на графике, чтобы увидеть, как менялись коэффициенты со временем.
Коэффициенты Polymarket устанавливаются реальными трейдерами, вкладывающими реальные деньги в свои убеждения, что обычно приводит к точным прогнозам. С объёмом торгов $1.4 million по “Ядерное испытание России...?” эти цены агрегируют коллективные знания и убеждённость тысяч участников — часто превосходя опросы, экспертные прогнозы и традиционные исследования. Рынки прогнозов, такие как Polymarket, имеют сильный послужной список точности, особенно когда события приближаются к дате разрешения. Например, месячный показатель точности Polymarket составляет 94%. Для получения последних статистических данных о точности прогнозов Polymarket посети страницу точности на Polymarket.
Чтобы совершить первую сделку на «Ядерное испытание России...?», зарегистрируй бесплатный аккаунт на Polymarket и пополни его с помощью криптовалюты, кредитной или дебетовой карты или банковского перевода. После пополнения аккаунта вернись на эту страницу, выбери исход, на который хочешь торговать, введи сумму и нажми «Торговать». Если ты новичок на рынках прогнозов, нажми на ссылку «Как это работает» вверху любой страницы Polymarket для пошагового руководства.
На Polymarket цена каждого исхода представляет подразумеваемую вероятность рынка. Цена 6¢ для «31 декабря 2026 года» на рынке «Ядерное испытание России...?» означает, что трейдеры коллективно оценивают вероятность того, что «31 декабря 2026 года» будет правильным результатом, примерно в 6%. Если ты купишь акции «Да» по 6¢ и исход окажется правильным, ты получишь $1,00 за акцию — прибыль 94¢ за акцию. Если нет — эти акции будут стоить $0.
Запланированная дата окончания рынка «Ядерное испытание России...?» прошла, но рынок ещё не был официально разрешён. Дата окончания указывает, когда ожидается наступление базового события. Рынок остаётся открытым для торговли до формального разрешения. Проверь статус разрешения и раздел «Правила» на этой странице для обновлений.
Рынок «Ядерное испытание России...?» имеет растущая дискуссия из 7 комментариев, где трейдеры делятся своим анализом, обсуждают исходы и последние события. Прокрути вниз до раздела комментариев, чтобы прочитать, что думают другие участники. Ты также можешь фильтровать по «Топ-держателям» или проверить вкладку «Активность» для ленты сделок в реальном времени.
Polymarket — крупнейший в мире рынок прогнозов, где ты можешь оставаться в курсе событий и зарабатывать на своих знаниях о реальных событиях. Трейдеры покупают и продают акции на исходы по темам от политики и выборов до криптовалют, финансов, спорта, технологий и культуры, включая рынки вроде «Ядерное испытание России...?». Цены отражают вероятности в реальном времени, подкреплённые финансовыми убеждениями, зачастую обеспечивая более быстрые и точные сигналы, чем опросы, эксперты или традиционные исследования.
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Часто задаваемые вопросы