**Trader consensus strongly favors "No" (90.9%) because no US ally has taken verifiable steps toward acquiring operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026, despite ongoing debates.** Discussions in South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia center on nuclear latency, enrichment rights, and energy cooperation rather than weaponization. South Korean public support for an indigenous capability reached 76% in 2025 polls amid North Korean missile advances, prompting talks of nuclear-powered submarines and uranium enrichment under revised US-ROK agreements. Japan has seen limited internal comments on nuclear options but maintains its non-nuclear principles, with officials quickly rebuking such suggestions. Saudi Arabia advanced civil nuclear talks with the US, including a 2025 joint declaration and draft 123 agreement reviewed in 2026, explicitly tied to nonproliferation standards and an Additional Protocol. These moves reflect hedging against regional threats and questions about extended deterrence credibility, yet they remain constrained by NPT obligations, US safeguards, technical timelines for fissile material production and delivery systems, and the absence of any ally announcing or conducting a test. The February 2026 expiration of New START has heightened global proliferation concerns without triggering ally breakouts. No scheduled events or confirmed actions in the next six months appear likely to compress these barriers enough for actual possession before 2027.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · ОбновленоДа
$51,592 Объем
$51,592 Объем
31 дек. 2026 г.
Да
$51,592 Объем
$51,592 Объем
31 дек. 2026 г.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Trader consensus strongly favors "No" (90.9%) because no US ally has taken verifiable steps toward acquiring operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026, despite ongoing debates.**
Discussions in South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia center on nuclear latency, enrichment rights, and energy cooperation rather than weaponization. South Korean public support for an indigenous capability reached 76% in 2025 polls amid North Korean missile advances, prompting talks of nuclear-powered submarines and uranium enrichment under revised US-ROK agreements. Japan has seen limited internal comments on nuclear options but maintains its non-nuclear principles, with officials quickly rebuking such suggestions. Saudi Arabia advanced civil nuclear talks with the US, including a 2025 joint declaration and draft 123 agreement reviewed in 2026, explicitly tied to nonproliferation standards and an Additional Protocol.
These moves reflect hedging against regional threats and questions about extended deterrence credibility, yet they remain constrained by NPT obligations, US safeguards, technical timelines for fissile material production and delivery systems, and the absence of any ally announcing or conducting a test. The February 2026 expiration of New START has heightened global proliferation concerns without triggering ally breakouts. No scheduled events or confirmed actions in the next six months appear likely to compress these barriers enough for actual possession before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Открытие рынка: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Объем
$51,592Дата окончания
31 дек. 2026 г.Открытие рынка
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
**Trader consensus strongly favors "No" (90.9%) because no US ally has taken verifiable steps toward acquiring operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026, despite ongoing debates.**
Discussions in South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia center on nuclear latency, enrichment rights, and energy cooperation rather than weaponization. South Korean public support for an indigenous capability reached 76% in 2025 polls amid North Korean missile advances, prompting talks of nuclear-powered submarines and uranium enrichment under revised US-ROK agreements. Japan has seen limited internal comments on nuclear options but maintains its non-nuclear principles, with officials quickly rebuking such suggestions. Saudi Arabia advanced civil nuclear talks with the US, including a 2025 joint declaration and draft 123 agreement reviewed in 2026, explicitly tied to nonproliferation standards and an Additional Protocol.
These moves reflect hedging against regional threats and questions about extended deterrence credibility, yet they remain constrained by NPT obligations, US safeguards, technical timelines for fissile material production and delivery systems, and the absence of any ally announcing or conducting a test. The February 2026 expiration of New START has heightened global proliferation concerns without triggering ally breakouts. No scheduled events or confirmed actions in the next six months appear likely to compress these barriers enough for actual possession before 2027.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Объем
$51,592Дата окончания
31 дек. 2026 г.Открытие рынка
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...**Trader consensus strongly favors "No" (90.9%) because no US ally has taken verifiable steps toward acquiring operational nuclear weapons by the end of 2026, despite ongoing debates.** Discussions in South Korea, Japan, and Saudi Arabia center on nuclear latency, enrichment rights, and energy cooperation rather than weaponization. South Korean public support for an indigenous capability reached 76% in 2025 polls amid North Korean missile advances, prompting talks of nuclear-powered submarines and uranium enrichment under revised US-ROK agreements. Japan has seen limited internal comments on nuclear options but maintains its non-nuclear principles, with officials quickly rebuking such suggestions. Saudi Arabia advanced civil nuclear talks with the US, including a 2025 joint declaration and draft 123 agreement reviewed in 2026, explicitly tied to nonproliferation standards and an Additional Protocol. These moves reflect hedging against regional threats and questions about extended deterrence credibility, yet they remain constrained by NPT obligations, US safeguards, technical timelines for fissile material production and delivery systems, and the absence of any ally announcing or conducting a test. The February 2026 expiration of New START has heightened global proliferation concerns without triggering ally breakouts. No scheduled events or confirmed actions in the next six months appear likely to compress these barriers enough for actual possession before 2027.
Экспериментальная сводка, созданная ИИ на основе данных Polymarket. Это не является торговой рекомендацией и не влияет на то, как разрешается этот рынок. · Обновлено
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