Trump administration negotiations for a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine remain stalled following President Zelensky's March 25 rejection of a U.S. proposal conditioning the deal on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, as reported by Reuters. Despite Zelensky's January claims that a security document was "100% ready" and April 1 talks with U.S. officials like Jared Kushner signaling intent to strengthen guarantees, no agreement has materialized amid policy shifts toward European burden-sharing and sharply reduced U.S. aid—$400 million annually via the FY2026 NDAA versus prior billions. Traders price a 90.5% "No" probability reflecting diplomatic impasse, territorial sticking points, and upcoming June peace talks unlikely to yield unconditional U.S. commitments before the deadline.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · GüncellendiABD, Ukrayna'ya 30 Haziran'a kadar güvenlik garantisi vermeyi kabul ediyor mu?
ABD, Ukrayna'ya 30 Haziran'a kadar güvenlik garantisi vermeyi kabul ediyor mu?
Evet
$139,553 Hac.
$139,553 Hac.
31 Ara 2026
Evet
$139,553 Hac.
$139,553 Hac.
31 Ara 2026
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trump administration negotiations for a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine remain stalled following President Zelensky's March 25 rejection of a U.S. proposal conditioning the deal on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, as reported by Reuters. Despite Zelensky's January claims that a security document was "100% ready" and April 1 talks with U.S. officials like Jared Kushner signaling intent to strengthen guarantees, no agreement has materialized amid policy shifts toward European burden-sharing and sharply reduced U.S. aid—$400 million annually via the FY2026 NDAA versus prior billions. Traders price a 90.5% "No" probability reflecting diplomatic impasse, territorial sticking points, and upcoming June peace talks unlikely to yield unconditional U.S. commitments before the deadline.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Piyasa Açıldı: Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ET
Hacim
$139,553Bitiş Tarihi
30 Haz 2026Piyasa Açıldı
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trump administration negotiations for a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine remain stalled following President Zelensky's March 25 rejection of a U.S. proposal conditioning the deal on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, as reported by Reuters. Despite Zelensky's January claims that a security document was "100% ready" and April 1 talks with U.S. officials like Jared Kushner signaling intent to strengthen guarantees, no agreement has materialized amid policy shifts toward European burden-sharing and sharply reduced U.S. aid—$400 million annually via the FY2026 NDAA versus prior billions. Traders price a 90.5% "No" probability reflecting diplomatic impasse, territorial sticking points, and upcoming June peace talks unlikely to yield unconditional U.S. commitments before the deadline.
This market will resolve to “Yes” if the United States formally commits to giving Ukraine a security guarantee, defined as a publicly announced and mutually agreed deal between the Trump administration and the Government of Ukraine which creates a binding obligation for the United States to defend or directly intervene on Ukraine’s behalf, by June 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No.”
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
A qualifying “security guarantee” requires language that is equivalent in character to a NATO Article 5–style mutual defense commitment: the United States must commit to responding militarily if Ukraine is attacked, or otherwise guarantee Ukraine’s defense through binding defense obligations. Examples of qualifying language include commitments modeled on the US treaties with Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, or NATO's Article 5 instrument, which obligates the United States to “act to meet the common danger” through military force if an ally is attacked. Cooperative frameworks, capacity-building measures, consultative mechanisms, or nonbinding pledges will not qualify.
Examples of non-qualifying arrangements include the June 13, 2024 US–Ukraine bilateral security agreement, the Taiwan Relations Act, or G7/EU “security arrangements” that provide support or consultation but stop short of binding defense guarantees.
A qualifying agreement must be jointly announced and finalized, and take the form of a treaty, executive agreement, memorandum of understanding, joint declaration, or equivalent written instrument. Announcements which are statements of intent, contingent, exploratory, or otherwise not indicative of a formalized policy will not count.
The primary resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Hacim
$139,553Bitiş Tarihi
31 Ara 2026Piyasa Açıldı
Dec 28, 2025, 6:02 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trump administration negotiations for a NATO Article 5-style bilateral security guarantee with Ukraine remain stalled following President Zelensky's March 25 rejection of a U.S. proposal conditioning the deal on Kyiv ceding Donbas to Russia, as reported by Reuters. Despite Zelensky's January claims that a security document was "100% ready" and April 1 talks with U.S. officials like Jared Kushner signaling intent to strengthen guarantees, no agreement has materialized amid policy shifts toward European burden-sharing and sharply reduced U.S. aid—$400 million annually via the FY2026 NDAA versus prior billions. Traders price a 90.5% "No" probability reflecting diplomatic impasse, territorial sticking points, and upcoming June peace talks unlikely to yield unconditional U.S. commitments before the deadline.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · Güncellendi
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