Trader consensus prices a 95.5% implied probability against the Iranian regime falling by May 31, reflecting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) effective consolidation of de facto power following U.S.-Israeli airstrikes in early March that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and inflicted heavy infrastructure damage. Despite ongoing economic freefall—rial depreciation, hyperinflation—and sporadic protests echoing the 2025–2026 unrest, no mass security force defections, coordinated nationwide uprisings, or command-and-control breakdowns have emerged in the past month, as IRGC parallel structures maintain repressive capacity amid a contested provisional leadership council. Recent analyses note contained dissent and regime resilience akin to past waves (2009, 2019, 2022). Realistic shifts could stem from sustained external blockades like Hormuz closures, elite fractures escalating to fragmentation, or sudden IRGC infighting, though historical precedents favor survival through brutal crackdowns.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · Güncellendiİran rejimi 31 Mayıs'a kadar düşecek mi?
İran rejimi 31 Mayıs'a kadar düşecek mi?
Evet
$1,391,386 Hac.
$1,391,386 Hac.
Evet
$1,391,386 Hac.
$1,391,386 Hac.
This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Piyasa Açıldı: Apr 1, 2026, 12:20 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...This requires a broad consensus of reporting indicating that core structures of the Islamic Republic (e.g. the office of the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, IRGC control under clerical authority) have been dissolved, incapacitated, or replaced by a fundamentally different governing system or otherwise lost de facto power over a majority of the population of Iran. This could occur via revolution, civil war, military coup, or voluntary abdication, but only qualifies if the Islamic Republic no longer exercises sovereign power.
Routine political events such as elections, reforms, or leadership succession do not qualify. Internal coups or power shifts that preserve the Islamic Republic’s core structures also do not qualify. Only a clear break in continuity—such as a new provisional government, revolutionary council, or constitution replacing the Islamic Republic will qualify.
Partial loss of territory or challenges from rebel or exile groups will not qualify unless the Islamic Republic no longer administers the majority of the Iranian population within Iran.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices a 95.5% implied probability against the Iranian regime falling by May 31, reflecting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) effective consolidation of de facto power following U.S.-Israeli airstrikes in early March that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and inflicted heavy infrastructure damage. Despite ongoing economic freefall—rial depreciation, hyperinflation—and sporadic protests echoing the 2025–2026 unrest, no mass security force defections, coordinated nationwide uprisings, or command-and-control breakdowns have emerged in the past month, as IRGC parallel structures maintain repressive capacity amid a contested provisional leadership council. Recent analyses note contained dissent and regime resilience akin to past waves (2009, 2019, 2022). Realistic shifts could stem from sustained external blockades like Hormuz closures, elite fractures escalating to fragmentation, or sudden IRGC infighting, though historical precedents favor survival through brutal crackdowns.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · Güncellendi
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Harici bağlantılara dikkat edin.
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