US intelligence assessments released on May 4 indicate limited new damage to Iran's nuclear facilities from ongoing military actions, with Iran's breakout time—time to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb—remaining around one year despite prior US and Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 and February 2026 that destroyed key aboveground enrichment sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. IAEA reports from late February highlight Iran's denial of agency access to these facilities, preventing verification of enriched uranium stockpiles stored underground at Isfahan or suspension of enrichment activities, though no evidence confirms active weaponization since Tehran halted its program in 2003 per US assessments. Trader consensus at 90.8% for "No" reflects these setbacks and institutional barriers, including Supreme Leader restrictions, amid fragile ceasefire talks; rapid shifts could arise from verified reconstitution or policy reversal.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jourOui
$581,343 Vol.
$581,343 Vol.
Oui
$581,343 Vol.
$581,343 Vol.
Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Marché ouvert : Nov 13, 2025, 5:50 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Resolver
0x65070BE91...US intelligence assessments released on May 4 indicate limited new damage to Iran's nuclear facilities from ongoing military actions, with Iran's breakout time—time to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb—remaining around one year despite prior US and Israeli airstrikes in June 2025 and February 2026 that destroyed key aboveground enrichment sites at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. IAEA reports from late February highlight Iran's denial of agency access to these facilities, preventing verification of enriched uranium stockpiles stored underground at Isfahan or suspension of enrichment activities, though no evidence confirms active weaponization since Tehran halted its program in 2003 per US assessments. Trader consensus at 90.8% for "No" reflects these setbacks and institutional barriers, including Supreme Leader restrictions, amid fragile ceasefire talks; rapid shifts could arise from verified reconstitution or policy reversal.
Résumé expérimental généré par IA à partir des données Polymarket. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de trading et ne joue aucun rôle dans la résolution de ce marché. · Mis à jour
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Méfiez-vous des liens externes.
Questions fréquentes