Trader consensus assigns a 96.3% implied probability to no Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite IRGC threats in late March amid escalating US-Iran tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Those warnings, targeting cables carrying most global data traffic like EIG, AAE-1, and SEA-ME-WE 6, prompted tech firms including Meta and Google to activate rerouting contingencies, but no follow-through has materialized in over two weeks. High confidence reflects mutual dependency—Iran relies on the same infrastructure—plus severe risks of US, UK, and allied naval retaliation. Realistic shifts could arise from sudden military escalation, Houthi proxy actions, or covert operations before resolution.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · AggiornatoL'Iran saboterà i cavi internet sottomarini entro il 30 aprile?
L'Iran saboterà i cavi internet sottomarini entro il 30 aprile?
Sì
$88,472 Vol.
$88,472 Vol.
30 apr 2026
Sì
$88,472 Vol.
$88,472 Vol.
30 apr 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus assigns a 96.3% implied probability to no Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite IRGC threats in late March amid escalating US-Iran tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Those warnings, targeting cables carrying most global data traffic like EIG, AAE-1, and SEA-ME-WE 6, prompted tech firms including Meta and Google to activate rerouting contingencies, but no follow-through has materialized in over two weeks. High confidence reflects mutual dependency—Iran relies on the same infrastructure—plus severe risks of US, UK, and allied naval retaliation. Realistic shifts could arise from sudden military escalation, Houthi proxy actions, or covert operations before resolution.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Mercato aperto: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Volume
$88,472Data di fine
30 apr 2026Mercato aperto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus assigns a 96.3% implied probability to no Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite IRGC threats in late March amid escalating US-Iran tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Those warnings, targeting cables carrying most global data traffic like EIG, AAE-1, and SEA-ME-WE 6, prompted tech firms including Meta and Google to activate rerouting contingencies, but no follow-through has materialized in over two weeks. High confidence reflects mutual dependency—Iran relies on the same infrastructure—plus severe risks of US, UK, and allied naval retaliation. Realistic shifts could arise from sudden military escalation, Houthi proxy actions, or covert operations before resolution.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Volume
$88,472Data di fine
30 apr 2026Mercato aperto
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus assigns a 96.3% implied probability to no Iranian sabotage of undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite IRGC threats in late March amid escalating US-Iran tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Those warnings, targeting cables carrying most global data traffic like EIG, AAE-1, and SEA-ME-WE 6, prompted tech firms including Meta and Google to activate rerouting contingencies, but no follow-through has materialized in over two weeks. High confidence reflects mutual dependency—Iran relies on the same infrastructure—plus severe risks of US, UK, and allied naval retaliation. Realistic shifts could arise from sudden military escalation, Houthi proxy actions, or covert operations before resolution.
Riepilogo sperimentale generato dall'AI con riferimento ai dati di Polymarket. Questo non è un consiglio di trading e non ha alcun ruolo nella risoluzione di questo mercato. · Aggiornato
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