US extended deterrence commitments and nonproliferation policies remain the dominant factor keeping implied probabilities for a new nuclear-armed ally below 10 percent through 2026. South Korea’s ongoing public debate over independent capabilities, driven by North Korean threats, has produced no enrichment or weapons program advances, while Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear talks with the United States continue under strict safeguards. Japan and Poland likewise show only rhetorical interest without infrastructure milestones. The expiration of New START in February 2026 has prompted allied modernization of delivery systems under NATO sharing arrangements but no independent arsenals. Any path to acquisition would require years of detectable technical steps, making resolution before 2027 highly improbable under current diplomatic and verification conditions.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · AtualizadoSim
$51,660 Vol.
$51,660 Vol.
31 dez 2026
Sim
$51,660 Vol.
$51,660 Vol.
31 dez 2026
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments and nonproliferation policies remain the dominant factor keeping implied probabilities for a new nuclear-armed ally below 10 percent through 2026. South Korea’s ongoing public debate over independent capabilities, driven by North Korean threats, has produced no enrichment or weapons program advances, while Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear talks with the United States continue under strict safeguards. Japan and Poland likewise show only rhetorical interest without infrastructure milestones. The expiration of New START in February 2026 has prompted allied modernization of delivery systems under NATO sharing arrangements but no independent arsenals. Any path to acquisition would require years of detectable technical steps, making resolution before 2027 highly improbable under current diplomatic and verification conditions.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Mercado Aberto: Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ET
Volume
$51,660Data de Término
31 dez 2026Mercado Aberto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
US extended deterrence commitments and nonproliferation policies remain the dominant factor keeping implied probabilities for a new nuclear-armed ally below 10 percent through 2026. South Korea’s ongoing public debate over independent capabilities, driven by North Korean threats, has produced no enrichment or weapons program advances, while Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear talks with the United States continue under strict safeguards. Japan and Poland likewise show only rhetorical interest without infrastructure milestones. The expiration of New START in February 2026 has prompted allied modernization of delivery systems under NATO sharing arrangements but no independent arsenals. Any path to acquisition would require years of detectable technical steps, making resolution before 2027 highly improbable under current diplomatic and verification conditions.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if credible reports from international nuclear agencies, a claimant government, or a consensus of credible global news sources officially confirm that a US ally which did not possess nuclear weapons as of November 12, 2025, possesses a nuclear weapon by December 31, 2026, 11:59 PM ET.
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
If a US ally participates in a nuclear sharing agreement that does not include independent control over nuclear weapons, this will not qualify for "Yes" resolution. Only full control over an operational nuclear weapon will count. Any admission from Israel of the possession of a nuclear weapon will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
For the purposes of this market, a "US ally" is defined as a country that is a member of NATO or a Major Non-NATO Ally (https://www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/) as of November 12, 2025. Otherwise, this market will resolve to "No".
Volume
$51,660Data de Término
31 dez 2026Mercado Aberto
Nov 13, 2025, 5:54 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...US extended deterrence commitments and nonproliferation policies remain the dominant factor keeping implied probabilities for a new nuclear-armed ally below 10 percent through 2026. South Korea’s ongoing public debate over independent capabilities, driven by North Korean threats, has produced no enrichment or weapons program advances, while Saudi Arabia’s civil nuclear talks with the United States continue under strict safeguards. Japan and Poland likewise show only rhetorical interest without infrastructure milestones. The expiration of New START in February 2026 has prompted allied modernization of delivery systems under NATO sharing arrangements but no independent arsenals. Any path to acquisition would require years of detectable technical steps, making resolution before 2027 highly improbable under current diplomatic and verification conditions.
Resumo experimental gerado por IA com dados do Polymarket. Isto não é aconselhamento de trading e não tem qualquer papel na resolução deste mercado. · Atualizado
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