Trader consensus prices "No" at 96.3% for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite IRGC threats in late March amid US-Iran military escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Ongoing conflict has prompted cable operators like Meta to pause projects and activate rerouting via contingency paths, but deliberate sabotage remains unprecedented due to mutual disruption—Iran relies on these submarine cables for its connectivity—and risks of swift US, UK, and French naval retaliation. Fact-checks have debunked viral claims of imminent action. Realistic shifts before resolution could stem from renewed escalation, Houthi proxy attacks, or unattributed naval operations later confirmed as Iranian.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · Güncellendiİran 30 Nisan'a kadar denizaltı internet kablolarını sabote edecek mi?
İran 30 Nisan'a kadar denizaltı internet kablolarını sabote edecek mi?
Evet
$88,425 Hac.
$88,425 Hac.
Evet
$88,425 Hac.
$88,425 Hac.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Piyasa Açıldı: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices "No" at 96.3% for Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite IRGC threats in late March amid US-Iran military escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Ongoing conflict has prompted cable operators like Meta to pause projects and activate rerouting via contingency paths, but deliberate sabotage remains unprecedented due to mutual disruption—Iran relies on these submarine cables for its connectivity—and risks of swift US, UK, and French naval retaliation. Fact-checks have debunked viral claims of imminent action. Realistic shifts before resolution could stem from renewed escalation, Houthi proxy attacks, or unattributed naval operations later confirmed as Iranian.
Polymarket verilerine atıfta bulunan deneysel AI tarafından oluşturulmuş özet. Bu bir işlem tavsiyesi değildir ve bu piyasanın nasıl çözümlendiğinde hiçbir rolü yoktur. · Güncellendi
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