Trader consensus prices a 96% implied probability against Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite late-March reports of threats amid US-Iran escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Fact-checks from early April confirm no credible evidence of direct Iranian statements or actions, with prior Red Sea cable damages attributed to Houthi-linked accidents rather than deliberate sabotage. High confidence stems from mutual disruption risks—Iran relies on these submarine cables for its connectivity—and robust US, UK, French naval deterrence. Realistic shifts could arise from unattributed proxy attacks, IRGC operations, or sudden de-escalation failures before the deadline.
Polymarket 데이터를 참조하는 실험적 AI 생성 요약입니다. 이것은 거래 조언이 아니며 이 마켓의 정산에 영향을 미치지 않습니다. · 업데이트예
$88,435 거래량
$88,435 거래량
2026.04.30
예
$88,435 거래량
$88,435 거래량
2026.04.30
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a 96% implied probability against Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite late-March reports of threats amid US-Iran escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Fact-checks from early April confirm no credible evidence of direct Iranian statements or actions, with prior Red Sea cable damages attributed to Houthi-linked accidents rather than deliberate sabotage. High confidence stems from mutual disruption risks—Iran relies on these submarine cables for its connectivity—and robust US, UK, French naval deterrence. Realistic shifts could arise from unattributed proxy attacks, IRGC operations, or sudden de-escalation failures before the deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
마켓 개설일: Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ET
거래량
$88,435종료일
2026.04.30마켓 개설일
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.Trader consensus prices a 96% implied probability against Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite late-March reports of threats amid US-Iran escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Fact-checks from early April confirm no credible evidence of direct Iranian statements or actions, with prior Red Sea cable damages attributed to Houthi-linked accidents rather than deliberate sabotage. High confidence stems from mutual disruption risks—Iran relies on these submarine cables for its connectivity—and robust US, UK, French naval deterrence. Realistic shifts could arise from unattributed proxy attacks, IRGC operations, or sudden de-escalation failures before the deadline.
This market will resolve to "Yes" if Iran or Iranian-aligned groups damage undersea internet cables between market creation and April 30, 2026, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
Only actions that cause physical damage to the undersea internet cable infrastructure, e.g., physical sabotage, such as cutting, dragging, or explosive attacks, will be considered. Cyber attacks will not qualify, even if they have kinetic effects.
Qualifying incidents must occur in the region spanning the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, including areas surrounding the Arabian Peninsula.
Attempted attacks that do not result in damage, or actions that are intercepted or fail to impact the cables, will not qualify for a "Yes" resolution.
Incidents which are broadly attributed to Iranian forces or Iranian-aligned groups will qualify regardless of the absence of definitive evidence or official Iranian denials.
The resolution source will be a consensus of credible reporting.
거래량
$88,435종료일
2026.04.30마켓 개설일
Mar 23, 2026, 6:23 PM ETResolver
0x65070BE91...Trader consensus prices a 96% implied probability against Iran sabotaging undersea internet cables by April 30, driven by the absence of any verified incidents despite late-March reports of threats amid US-Iran escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Fact-checks from early April confirm no credible evidence of direct Iranian statements or actions, with prior Red Sea cable damages attributed to Houthi-linked accidents rather than deliberate sabotage. High confidence stems from mutual disruption risks—Iran relies on these submarine cables for its connectivity—and robust US, UK, French naval deterrence. Realistic shifts could arise from unattributed proxy attacks, IRGC operations, or sudden de-escalation failures before the deadline.
Polymarket 데이터를 참조하는 실험적 AI 생성 요약입니다. 이것은 거래 조언이 아니며 이 마켓의 정산에 영향을 미치지 않습니다. · 업데이트
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